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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction 
There has been recent concern about the ethical and methodological 
consequences of deception in psychological experimentation. Role playing, 
defined in this paper as a methodology in which subjects are asked to 
' pretend that they are in a particular situation and to predict what their 
behavior would be, offers one alternative to deception. There are many 
variants of role playing, depending upon the amount of information given 
to ... the.. suhj:ects and .. their de:g;i;:.ee. of active involvement in the role. 
The data obtained when using these role-playing variants have uncertain 
validity. Presumably the more realistic t.he situation is made the 
better able the subject should be to imagine what he would actually do 
if he were in the real situation. 
The present study attempts to investigate some of the variants of 
role playing by employing the Asch-backwards paradigm (Kane and Tedeschi, 
1972). In Asch's original studies (1956), three or more persons acted 
as confederates by giving unanimous erroneous line judgments on a 
standard line-judgment task. The subject believed the confederates were 
subjects like himself. His line-judgment response always followed the 
responses of the confederates. The dependent variable was whether he 
conformed to their erroneous judgrrents or made independently correct 
judgments. Asch found that the majority of people did in fact conform 
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to the group's erroneous judgments. Kane and Tedeschi wanted to see what 
individuals think of persons who conform to their erroneous judgments. 
In the Asch-back.wards paradigm they adopted, three subjects were told that 
they would serve as the confederates in the original Asch situation. In 
reality they were the actual subjects and the "subject" in the original 
Asch experiments was actually a confederate who consistently conformed 
to their erroneous line-judgments or made independently correct judgments 
on each trial. Subjects were then asked to rate the "subject" (confeder-
ate) on the basis of his behavior. They found that conforming "subjects" 
were rated more negatively than the independent "subjects'', suggesting 
that conformity may be costly in terms of negative evaluations. 
·A modified version of the Asch-back.wards situation is enacted in 
the present study with the "subject" serving as an actor and one of the 
"confederates" serving_ as an observer in order that role playing may be 
investigated in terms of actor/observer considerations. Attribution 
theoriests investigate the responsibility attributions made by individuals, 
and Jones and Nisbett (1972) have shown that persons who actually perform 
the behavior make different attributions than do persons who merely 
observe the action. Actors tend to focus on situational cues while 
observers usually consider the dispositional traits of the actor. If 
the consideration of different factors lead to divergent responsibility 
attributions, as has been shown, then it is likely that different factors 
are similarly considered by role players depending upon whether they are 
asked to assume the role of an actor or observer. The consideration of 
the more general dispositional factors, characteristic of observers, 
should be easily duplicated in a role-playing situation. A recent study 
by Vance and Helm (1975) supports this contention. Using the Asch-
back.wards paradigm, they asked the confederates (observers) to rate the 
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independent or conforming subject (actor) on the basis of his behavior in 
the experiment, replicating the Asch-backwards study by Kane and Ted-
eschi. In addition, they asked role-playing subjects to rate an imaginary 
person on the basis of a written description of his conforming or indep-
endent behavior in the traditional Asch conformity situation. These 
role-playing subjects did not actually experience the experimental sit-
uation, but were able to accurately match the impression ratings provided 
by the subjects who actually participated in the enactment of the Asch 
situation itself. It should be much more difficult for subjects who are 
asked to assume the role of an actor, by rating or predicting his own 
behavior, to accurately match similar ratings or behaviors provided by 
other subjects who actually experienced the experimental situation. 
Since actors are thought to consider situational cues, role-playing 
subjects who have not ex.perienced these cues would not be able to consider 
them and, hence, would not be expected to respond to a written descript-
ion as they would actually respond in a real situation. 
The present study is a partial replication of the earlier studies by 
Kane and Tedeschi (1972) and Vance and Helm (1975). In addition, the 
"subject" (actor) in the Asch-backwards situation is asked to provide 
ratings of herself, and two groups of role-playing subjects with 
varying degrees of active involvement in the experimental situation are 
asked to assume the role of actor and provide ratings of themselves in 
that role. In essence, all subjects are asked to play a role, but with 
differing levels of information. Subjects in the in situ (the term 
in situ translates roughly "in the original situation") condition are 
deceived as to what their actual role will be. They are told that they 
are to act as accomplices in the experiment, but in reality they are 
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actual subjects. lhe subject who is as~ed to assume the role of the 
"subject" in the Asch-backwards situation in order to deceive the 
"confederates" actually servers as the actor in the actor/observer 
context, and her conforming or independent behavior provides the action 
to be observed. The actor provides ratings of herself and how she 
expects to be rated by the "confederates". The three "confederates" 
are also subjects, each fulfilling a different role in the experiment. 
One of the "confederates'' assumes the role of an observer, rating the 
actor on the basis of her behavior in the experimental situation. The 
actual actor and observer have therefore assumed a role, but rate the 
actor from their own points of view rather than predicting the ratings 
someone else would make, thus distinguishing them from the role-playing 
subjects in the experiment. The other two "confederates" are asked to 
role play the situation by predicting the "subject's" (actor's) ratings, 
one predicting how she will rate herself and one predicting how she will 
expect to be rated by the "confederates" •. The_se role players differ 
from those in the scenario condition in that they are deceived as to the 
true purpose of the experiment and their role in it, while they actually 
experience the experimental situation in its entirety. 
Subjects in the scenario condition ("scenario" will indicate that 
.subjects did not actually experience the experimental situation, but were 
instead given a written description of the situation) are given written 
information about the experiences of the subjects in the in situ con-
dition and are asked to predict the ratings provided by the in situ 
subjects. They are not deceived as to their role in the experiment. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Miller (1972) has reviewed the pros and cons of role playing in an 
article expressing the major emphases of the advocates and opponents. 
According to Miller, the proponents of role playing have emphasized what 
they consider as its two primary attractions: (a) a more ethically 
dignified atmosphere characterized by honesty and collaboration; and (b) 
the potential for bypassing certain response styles· of reactive disposit-
ions. Opponents of role playing, on the other hand, argue against the 
validity of role-playing predictions, asserting that reports from role 
players have an introspective nature that is unreliable in predicting 
the actual outcome of experiments. Thus, there is a dilemma. Laboratory 
procedures offer experimental rigor but are frequently inconvenient, and 
more often deceptive; role-playing procedures offer high utility and no 
deception, but may have'. questionable validity. Regardless of the various 
viewpoints of the proponents and opponents of role playing, most tend to 
agree that experimental investigation is needed to set the limits for 
role playing. Thus far, the investigations have been few and the results 
varied. 
The present s.tudy was undertaken to further define the limits and 
utility of role playing by experimentally applying the concepts of a 
relatively new theoretical principle, the actor/observer attributional 
divergence (Jones & Nisbett, 1972), to its investigation. The study 
partially represents a replication of two studies, Kane and Tedeschi 
(1972) found that those who make independent judgments in an Asch (1956) 
line judgment task are generally rated more positively than are conformers 
in the same task. They concluded that conforming behaviors may be 
costly in terms of negative evaluation. Vance and Helm (1975) found that 
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such attributions could be accurately matched by role-playing observers 
who had not actually observed the behavior but had merely read a des-
cription of it. The factors considered by observers appear readily 
accessible to role players who assume their point of view. Persons who 
actually perform the behavior, however, rely on more circumstantial 
information concerning the event. Such information is typically gained 
only in.an experiential context and would seem difficult for role players 
who did not experience the situation to comprehend. The major question 
asked in the present study is whether scenario and in situ role-playing 
actors can match the pattern of attributions provided by in situ 
' 
actors who rate themselves. If ig situ role players successfully match 
the ratings of the.in: situ actors but scenario role players do not, this 
would imply that the situational factors experienced by in situ actors 
gr,eatly affect the actors' impression ratings., as the principles of the 
actor/observer divergence phenomena would lead one to expect, and that 
these factors are not salient outside of an experiential context. Since 
they are not experienced by scenario role players they cannot be compre-
hended by them. Consequently, these role players should fail to match 
the pattern of ratings provided by in situ actors. 
In situ and scenario actors in the present study are not only 
asked to make self-attributions, but also to predict the attributions 
made to them by observers. Impression management theory (Goffman, 1969) 
supports the contention that people (actors) are concerned about their 
evaluation by others and therefore attempt to assess the effects of 
their behaviors on the others' attributions. It is presumed that im-
pression management activities and assessments of others' impressions of 
us dominate many of our everyday behaviors has recently been stressed by 
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such writers as Laing, Phillipson and Lee (1966) and Middlebrooks (1974), 
and its validity was clearly demonstrated in a study by Whiteside and 
Helm (1975) who employed an Asch-backwards paradigm similar to the one 
used in the present study. They found that self-impressions differed 
little as a function of actors' conforming or independent roles, but 
differences were quite evident when actors predicted the attributions 
made to them by others, indicating that they were concerned with im-
pression management notions. It is likely that such concerns are dealt 
with only in situations where actual interpersonal interactions are 
experienced. Whether similar effects can be realized in a scenario re-
enactment of the situation has not been demonstrated. The inclusion of 
both perspectives (SELF and OTHER'S VIEW) provided the advantage of 
assessing the effects of actors' self and impression-management concerns 
in both concrete (in situ) and abstract (scenario) settings. 
Thus, this study re-enacts the Asch (1956) conformity situation, 
with one of the "confederates" serving as an observer and a "subject" 
serving as an actor in the in situ situation. Both observers and actors 
provide impression ratings of the actor in each instance and actors 
predict the observers' ratings. Role-playing subjects in the in situ 
condition are asked to predict the ratings provided by the in situ 
actor. Role-playing subjects in the scenario condition are provided 
with information concerning the in situ situation and are asked to predict 
the impression ratings of the participants on rating scales which are 
identical to those used in the in situ setting. The Asch-backwards 
paradigm (Kane and Tedeschi, 1972) is incorporated in the present study 
for two primary reasons. First, two previous studies (Kane and Tedeschi, 
1972; Vance and Helm, 1975) which employed this paradigm have made data 
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available for replication in this study·. Secondly, the conformity 
variable has typically been used in studies investigating the limits of 
role playing (Willis and Willis, 1970; Horowitz and Rothschild, 1970), 
and this particular paradigm is such that the behavior of the actor can 
be exactly defined in terms of conformity or independence. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITEP.ATURE AND STATEMENT 
OF HYPOTHESES 
Introduction 
In 1954, Edgar Vinacke expressed concern over the deception of human 
subjects in experimentation, and asked for " •.• the proper balance 
between the interests of science and the thoughtful treatement of the 
persons who innocentJ.y, supply the data. 11 (p. 155). Herbert Kelman 
revived interest in the issue in 1967 when he asserted that the problem 
of deception in social psychological experiments had taken on increas-
ingly serious proportions since Vinacke's (1954) article. He pointed 
out the ethical implications of widespread deception, insisting that the 
experimenter-subject relationship 11 is a real interhuman relationship, in 
which we have responsibility toward the subject as another human being 
whose dignity we must preserve" (p. 5). 
Kelman also expressed concern about the methodological implications 
of deceptive research practices, suggesting that the basic assumption in 
the use of deception -- that the subject's awareness of the experimental 
conditions and phenomena under study would alter his behavior such that 
valid conclusions could not be obtained -- is constantly being threatened 
since the level of sophistication in the subject pool is necessarily 
raised with each exposure of experimental deception. The truly naive 
subject has become rare indeed and the actual assessment of subjects' 
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suspicions is now itself a phenomenon of investigation (Rubin & Moore, 
1971; McGuire, 1969). Kelman's concern led him to predict long-term 
negative consequences, both methodologically and ethically, for a dis-
cipline (social psychology) whose basis for developing a field of inquiry 
is massive deception. He concluded by suggesting that the problem be 
dealt with through increased awareness of the negative implications of 
deception, resulting in its use only when justified; the exploration of 
ways to counteract and minimize the negative consequences of deception 
when i.t is used; and, the development of new experimental techniques that 
dispense with deception and rely on subjects' positive motivations. 
Kelman suggested role playing as a possibility for one of these new 
experimental techniques, thereby involving the subject as an active par-
ticipant in a joint venture with the experimenter. In summarizing 
several studies which dealt with role playing, Kelman conc,luded: 
While there is obviously a great deal that we need to know 
about the meaning of this situation to the subjects, they 
did react differentially to the experimental manipulations and 
these reactions followed an orderly pattern, despite the fact 
that they knew it was all make-believe (p. 10). 
The Role Playing-Versus-Deception Debate 
Kelman's negative view of deception and his optimism toward role 
playing as its possible alternative found immediate support from others 
(Ring, 1967; Brown, 1962, 1965; Schultz, 1969). Roger Brown (1962) be-
lieved role playing subjects actually gave more valid information than 
that provided by the "hoodwinked" subjects of most deception experiments. 
In agreement, Schultz (1969) added, " ..• the best way of investigating 
the nature of man is to ask him" (p. 227). Schultz adovcated two methods 
which employed the "asking" technique, one of which was the role playing 
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approach suggested by Kelman (1967). The other, suggested by Jourard 
(1968), involved a mutual self-disclosure between the experimenter and 
the subject. Both approaches adopt a more realistic image of the human 
subject, changing, as Jourard pointed out, "the status of the subject 
from that of an anonymous object of our study to the status of a person, 
a fellow seeker, a·collaborator in our enterprise" (Jourard, 1968, p. 
25). 
The opposite position concerning role playing has been taken by 
numerous other social psychologists, however. In the revised Handbook 
of Social Psychology (1968), Aronson and Carlsmith argue against role 
playing, asserting that it lacks realism. Accordingly, "There are some 
very.serious difficulties with the role-playing approach; these are 
similar to the problems arising from introspective reports" (p. 27). 
Thes.e men w.e.re .. joinad_ by oJ:her r.es.ea.rchers who pointed out the extreme 
limitations of utility and generalizability associated with a role-
playing paradigm (McGuire, 1969; Freedman, 1969; Carlson, 1971; Kiesler, 
Collins, & Miller, 1969). Freedman (1969), especially, presented some 
very convincing arguments, leading to this conclusion: 
I think it is a very serious mistake to consider role playing an 
acceptable substitute. On the contrary, the use of role playing 
under most circumstances constitutes a return to the prescientific 
days when intuition and consensus took the place of data (p. 108). 
Freedman continued by listing four ways of utilizing role playing: 
(a) as a straight substitute for experimental research, (b) alongside 
experimental research with the eventual intention to use it as a substi-
tute should it prove to produce equivalent results, (c) as a substitute 
only when experimental research on the problem is impossible, and (d) 
to produce data specifically designed to test a theory, as was done by 
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Bern (1967) in his explanation of the cognitive dissonance phenomenon. 
According to Freedman, all but the first are somewhat acceptable. He 
considers role playing as a straight substitute for experimental re-
search, the use of role playing gives, "additional knowledge about role 
playing itself, about people's assumptions about the world and how they 
differ from reality" (p. 109), and may eventually allow the researcher 
to use role playing instead of the experimental paradigm with some con-
fidence in that situation. 
Th.us, role playing may be beneficial as a phenomenon for study in 
itself, giving evidence as to what .affects people's guesses or judgments 
in particular situations. Attribution theorists have investigated these 
effects by considering the causal attributions made by different indiv-
iduals. Reider's (1958) naive man-on-the-street is said to consider 
ho.th. the. sj~tuation,, and the actor when as.signing". causality fox. an act •. 
Investigators who have extended Reider's ideas have learned to qualify 
his assumptions. They have discovered a distinct difference between 
individuals who merely observe the action and those who actually perform. 
it (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; McArthur, 1972; Storms, 1973). Actors tend 
to emphasize situational concomitants as causes of their acts, while 
observers consistently stress the actor's characteristics as producing 
behaviors. Obviously, this divergence exists because of a basic differ-. 
ence in the types of information being considered by them. If the con-
sideration. of different factors can influence the causal attributions 
made by individuals, it seems certain that considerations of the actor-
observer divergence would be useful in assessing the data of role-
playing subjects. Except for the Vance and Helm (1975) study, the div-
ergent viewpoints demonstrated by actors and observers have been over-
looked in the writings of role-playing investigators. 
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The Actor/Observer Divergence 
According to Jones and Nisbett (1972): "There is a pervasive 
tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational require-
ments, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable 
personal dispositions" (p. 80). This is due to the fact that actors 
and observers bring different information to bear on their inferences 
about the actor and his environment because different aspects of the 
event are available or salient for them. For the observer, the actor's 
behavior is the ''figural stimulus against the ground of the situation". 
Thus, the action itself is more salient to the observer and is the focal, 
commanding stimulus. His knowledge is limited with regard to the' 
actor's emotional state, intentions, or personal history; thus, the ob-
server is characteristically normative and nomothetic, comparing the 
actor with other actors and judging his attributes accordingly. The 
actor, on the other hand, is more inclined to use an idiographic re-
ference scale, judging his actions with reference to his other previous 
actions rather than to the behaviors of other actors. His attention is 
directed outward toward the environment with its constantly shifting 
demands and opportunities. Subsequently, he perceives his behavior to 
be a response to environmental cues that trigger, guide, and terminate 
it. Behavior is thus seen by the observer to be a manifestation of the 
actor and is seen by the actor as a response to the situation. Pre-
sumably, the more the observer is set to empathize with the actor, the 
more similar their attributional perspectives will be, but the observer 
is ordinarily expected to show that general observer tendency to under-
estimate the role of the environment. 
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Jones and Nisbett go on to speculate concerning the "correctness" 
of each of these divergent trends. They feel that the observer often 
errs by over-attributing dispositions, since evidence for the existence 
of personality traits in sparse (Mischel, 1968). They write: 
Without insisting that the actor is usually right, we can point 
to many instances where the observer's interpretation of behav-
ior is simply wrong ... the observer seems to underestimate · 
the power of the situation and to overestimate the uniqueness of 
the (in fact modal) response (p. 88). 
They conclude the "traits exist more in the eye of the beholder than 
in the psyche of the actor" (p. 89). 
It is not surprising that Vance and Helm (1975) could demonstrate 
the validity of the data provided by role-playing observers in relation 
to that provided by fn situ observers, since the attributions of both are 
based on very limited information and generalized "traits". It should be 
much more difficult to demonstrate such validity between role-playing and 
in situ actors, however, since actors typically provide data of an 
11 idiographic 11 nature based on their reactions to the situational cues. 
Role players who actually experience the experimental situation should 
be much more successful in duplicating the response pattern obtained 
from the in situ actors. It is expected that impression management 
notions will be depicted in the OTHER'S VIEW perspective provided by in 
~actors, displaying a marked departure from their self ratings, since 
it has been demonstrated that people are concerned with their evaluations 
by others (Whiteside and Helm, 1975). All individuals, after all, are 
perforced both actors and observers, and, as has been domonstrated 
(Storms, 1973), are simultaneously aware of the considerations which are 
appropriate to the other role. As mentioned earlier these impression 
management notions probably result from perceived or anticipated inter-
actions with others and may not become salient for role players in a 
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scenario situation. Role players who experience the interaction 
should be better able to assess the actor's impression management 
concerns and correctly predict her OTHER'S VIEW ratings. 
Role-Playing Paradigms 
The operational definition of role playing is of foremost impor-
tance in experiments comparing deception and role-playing methodologies. 
In 1967, Greenberg used a role-playing procedure that has comet~ be 
known as the "forewarning" technique in an effort to replicate an 
earlier study by Schachter (1959). In Schachter's study, high-and-
low-anxiety states were created in subjects by telling them that they 
were about to receive either a series of rather severe and painful 
electrical shocks (high anxiety) or a series of mild electrical 
shocks (low anxiety). Subjects in both groups were subsequently told 
that it would take a few minutes to prepare the apparatus and that each 
subject could spend this waiting time alone or_ in the company of others. 
Each subject was then presented with two scales which measured his 
willingness to wait alone or in the company of others, providing a 
measure of his need for affiliation. No shocks were administered, as 
the experiment terminated at this point. Schachter found that high 
anxiety produces a greater tendency to prefer affiliation than low 
anxiety only among firstborn and only child subjects and not among 
later-born subjects, and that firstborn and only child subjects have a 
greater desire to affiliate with others than later-born subjects only 
under conditions of high anxiety but not under conditions of low anxiety. 
Greenberg used the forewarning procedure of role playing to test 
for the same results. Although he asked his subjects to role play, he 
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omitted detailed descriptions of the experimental manipulations. Each 
subject was simply asked to assume the role of a subject who was about 
to receive the electrical shocks, either severe or mild. The results 
of Greenberg's experiment are complex. The anxiety manipulation was 
successful only for firstborn and only-child subjects, not later horns, 
and the statistical analysis on the 2 x 2 design (Birth Order x Manip-
ulation Anxiety) revealed no significant differences between any of the 
experimental conditions: high anxiety - first born and only children, 
high anxiety - later-born children, low anxiety - first born and only 
children, and low anxiety - later-born children. He then partitioned his 
subjects into two different groups based on perceived anxiety. Categor-
ized ·in this manner, the data confirmed Schachter's (1959) finding that 
high anxiety produces greater affiliation than low anxiety among first-
born and only-child subjects. Despite these qualifications, Greenberg 
regarded his experiment as a success in terms of the stated purpose of 
his study, though others (e.g., Miller, 1972) have disagreed. 
Greenberg's results did, however, seem promising to role-playing 
advocates. A few years later, Willis and Willis (1970) attempted a 
different type of role-playing procedure, known as "prebriefing", in a 
basic conformity experiment. This 11prebriefing" variant of role playing 
involves the detailed presentation of experimental conditions to role-
playing subjects, in contrast to the forewarning technique which does 
not provide a full description of the situation. The results were 
promising, though somewhat limited, since the interaction that occurred 
in the actual experiment was not obtained in the role-playing phase. 
Willis and Willis concluded: 
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In this experiment role playing has shown some capacity 
to duplicate results obtained by conventional deception tech~ 
niques. However, this capacity was limited to the more obvious 
main effect ••. The mo~e subtle, and more interesting, inter-
action • . • was not picked up by the role-playing techniques 
•.• We tentatively conclude that role playing provides an 
appropriate alternative to deception only insofar as obvious 
effects are under consideration (p. 476). 
Horowitz and Rothschild (1970) contrasted the effects of the 
"prebriefing" and "forewarning" role-playing techniques with live 
deception in a modified Asch conformity experiment. They concluded: 
. • • it does appear that the forewarned variant has been an 
effective substitute for deception in both the Greenberg (1967) 
experiment and the present study. The forewarned variant appears 
to mitigate the ethical pitfalls of deception without vitiating 
the experimental realism of the manipulations (p. 226). 
As mentioned in Chapter I, Vance and Helm (1975) demonstrated that 
the dissimilar effects obtained by the 11prebriefing" and "forewarning" 
procedures would not occur in the role playing of impressions ratings 
if the impressions are limited to the observer's perspective (Jones 
& Nisbett, 1972). They noted that role-playing data that matches the 
data provided by in situ subjects has more often been produced when 
subjects have behaved as observers, emphasizing an actor's traits 
(similar to forewarning procedures), rather than as actor's, concerned 
with the effects of circumstances (similar to prebriefing procedures). 
Using Asch's conformity paradigm as modified by Kane and Tedeschi (1972), 
they found parallel patterns of trait impressions in the in situ condi-
tion and written-scenario conditions, indicating that role-playing 
observers can accurately predict attributions made by "deceived" in situ 
observers. They then suggested that role players who must adopt actors' 
considerations might not accurately predict the attributions of in situ 
actors when they cannot experience the actual situation. The present 
study provides a test of that proposition. 
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Hypotheses 
There are three explicit hypotheses concerning the present study, 
two of which involve replications ·of earlier studies. 
Kane and Tedeschi (1972) found that the independent, or nonconform-
ing..:, subject.a.. in the, Asch line-judgment situation were rated more 
positively by the conforming subjects, suggesting that conformity is 
costly in terms of negative evaluations. The first hypothesis of the 
present paper is a restatement of their findings: 
1) In the in situ version of the study, the independent actor 
(subject) will be rated more positively by the observer 
(confederate) than will the conforming actor, replicating the 
study by Kane and Tedeschi (1972). 
Hypothesis II 
Vance and Helm (1975) found that role-playing confederates could 
accurately match the pattern of impression ratings provided by the 
in situ confederates when rating subjects on the basis of their conform-
ing or independent behaviors in the Asch-backwards situation. The second 
hypothesis of this paper is a restatement of their findings: 
·2) Role-playing observers (confederates) will be able to 
accurately match (the pattern of significant differences will 
be the same) the impression ratings provided by the in situ 
.observers (confederates), replicating Vance and Helm-Cl975). 
Hypothesis III 
Experimental research investigating the effectiveness of role 
playing as an alternative methodology to deception has yielded varied 
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and inconclusive results (Greenberg, 1967; Willis and Willis, 1970; 
Horowitz and Rothschild, 1970). Vance and Helm (1975) have suggested 
that these divergent results might stem from the divergent considerations 
common to actors and observers (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). As indicated 
by Jones and Nisbett (1972), observers of behavior typically consider the 
more general dispositional factors of the actor. These behaviors which 
observers interpret in terms of dispositional factors can be described 
in writing, and can therefore be established in a role-playing situation 
without the subjects actually experiencing the experimental situation 
itself. Vance and Helm (1975) used this approach to show a high level 
of empirical accuracy between in~ and role-playing observers, who 
appear to judge others on a nomothetic basis. Actors, on the other hand, 
use an idiographic reference scale, focusing on the specifics of the 
stimulus situation and, probably, the effects of their actions upon the 
impressions of others. Their considerations should thus be more diffi-
cult to re-enact in a role-playing situation •. If role players are 
allowed to experience the same experimental situation as was experienced 
by the in situ actors, however, the factors considered should be 
somewhat similar for both in situ actors and in situ role-playing actors. 
Explicitly stated, the final and most important hypothesis of the present 
paper is: 
3) Role-playing actors in the scenario condition will not be 
able to accurately match the impression ratings provided by the 
in situ actors (subjects). Role-playing actors in the in situ 
condition will be able to accurately match (the pattern~£~~ 
significant differences will be the same) the impression ratings 
provided by the in situ actors (subjects). 
CHAPrER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Subjects 
One-hundred twenty female Introductory Psychology students part-
icipated in the experiment for extra class credit and were randomly 
assigned to either the: conform or independent experimental conditions 
and to the various phases of the study (in situ versus scenario, actor 
versus observer). 
Instruments 
The nature and results of the original Asch studies were described 
to all subjects in both the in situ and scenario versions of the study. 
In addition to this, the Asch-backwards studies (Kane and Tedeschi, 1972) 
were explained to the in situ actors. The standard Asch-backwards exper-
iment, as adopted by Kane and Tedeschi, was employed in establishing 
the experimental manipulation in the in situ version of the present 
experiment. The instruments used in the experimental manipulation were 
18 stimulus cards, similar to those used in Asch's original stud!es 
(1956). Each consisted of a stimulus line followed by three lines 
varying in length, only one of which equaled the length of the stimulus 
line. 
Following the line-judgment activities (see Procedures, below), 
identical impression scales were used in each of the experimental condit-
ions in both the in situ and scenario studies and for both actors and 
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observers. A versi.on of the Semantic Differential (SD: Osgood, Suci 
and Tannenbaum, 1957) provided ratings on Activity, Potency, Evaluation 
and Affect dimensions, and on polar-adjective scales measuring Aecom-
mocation, Cooperation, and Inhibition (Appendix A). Each polar-adjectj_ve 
scale was scored from 1 to 7. The Activity dimension included the sum 
of active-passive, progressive-regressive, stable-changeable, and calm-
excitable polar adjective scales; the Affect dimension included the sum 
of friendly-unfriendly, pleasant-unpleasant, insincere-sincere, and trust-
worthy-untrustworthy polar adjective scales; the Evaluation dimension 
included the sum of bad-good, dishonest-honest, harmful-beneficial, and 
king-cruel polar adjective scales; arid the Potency dimension consisted 
of the hard-soft, cautious-rash, weak-strong, and severe-lenient scales. 
Design 
Forty subjects were assigned to the role of observer in either the 
conform or independnet line-judgment condition and in either the in situ 
or scenario phase and provided ratings of the actor (OTHER perspective) 
based on their observation of the actor's behavior in the experiment or 
a written description of that behavior. The observers in the in situ ---
condition served as confederates in the experimental manipulation and 
their ratings provided a replication of the Kane and Tedeschi (1972) 
study. Those in the scenario condition predicted the ratings of the in 
situ observers, providing a replication of the Vance and Helm (1975) 
study. 
Eighty subjects were assigned to the actor role in either the conform 
or independent condition. Twenty of these were in the scenario condition. 
Sixty of the actors participated in the in situ condition, but only 
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twenty of the in situ actors actually acted out the actor role in the 
Asch-backwards paradigm, rating themselves (SELF perspective) and how 
they expected to be rated by others (OTHER'S VIEW perspective) in re-
peated measures. The ordering of the two rating tasks across subjects 
followed an abba pattern, with both ratings taken after the presentation 
of the Asch paradigm and the line-judgment activities. The other in 
situ actors were role players acting as "confederates" during the ex-
perimental manipulation and then predicting the ratings provided by the 
in situ actors from either the SELF actor's view of self) or OTHER'S 
VIEW (actor's view of how observers see her) perspectives (nonrepeated 
measures). The twenty "actors" in the scenario condition predicted the 
SELF and OTHER'S VIEW ratings (repeated measures) provided by the in 
situ actors on the basis of a written description of the situation. The 
ordering of the two rating tasks across these subjects also followed an 
abba pattern. Thus, there were in situ actors who participated as 
"subjects'' in the Asch-backwards manipulation and provided ratings of 
SELF and OTHER'S VIEW, in situ role-playing actors who experienced the 
experimental situation by participating as "confederates" in the Asch-
backwards manipulation and predicted the SELF and OTHER'S VIEW ratings 
of the in situ actors, and role-playing actors in the scenario condition 
who did not experience the experimental situation but predicted the SELF 
and OTHER'S VIEW ratings of the in situ actors following a written des.-
cription of the experimental manipulation. 
There were eight sets of data on which one-way ANOVA's (producing an 
F-value which corresponds to ! 2) were performed, each with 1 and 18 
degrees of freedom (n = 10 per cell). The independent variable in each 
condition was whether the actor conformed or made independently correct 
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line judgments. Two of the tests were performed on sets of data provided 
by observers, one by in situ observers (OTHER perspective) and one by 
role-playing actors in the scenario condition (OTHER perspective), al-
lowing a replication of the Kane and Tedeschi (1972) and Vance and Helm 
(1975) studies. Six tests were performed on sets of data provided by 
actors, two by in situ actors (SELF and OTHER'S VIEW perspectives), two 
by role-playing actors in the in situ condition (SELF and OTHER'S VIEW 
per~pectives), and two by role-playing actors in the sc.enario condition 
(SELF and OTHER'S VIEW perspectives). 
It should be noted that the design of the present study does not 
present an opportunity for exploring the utility of role playing in 
"picking up" the subtle interactions of experimental dimensions, a 
problem which has been raised by other role-playing investigators 
(Willis and Willis, 1970). 
Procedures 
Five subjects and two experimenters were used for each experimental 
setting. Both male and female experimenters were used in each of the 
experimental conditions. 
In Situ Actor ("Subject") 
The first subject to arrive was designated as the in situ actor. 
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24 
differed considerably from the standard line. Individuals 
acted as accomplices by reporting unanimous, erroneous or wrong 
judgments on twelve of the eighteen trials. Asch wanted to see 
if the subject would conform to such wrong judgments of the 
group. His results showed that in a large majority of cases the 
subject did indeed conform to wrong judgments. We are interested 
in extending Asch's study to find out how the confederates view-
ed the subjects who either conformed or didn't conform to their 
erroneous judgments. Therefore, we would like you to be an 
accomplice in this experiment by posing as an actual subject in 
the Asch conformity situation. We have signed up three other 
girls for this experiment. When they arrive they will be taken 
to.another room and will be told that we are simply replicating 
Asch' s original' experiment to see if' the majority of people 
still conform to group pressure today as they did in the 'SO's 
when Asch was conducting his experiments. They will not be aware 
that the experiment has been reversed and that they are now the 
actual subjects and you are the confederate. Since there are two 
experimental conditions in this study, one· where the individual 
conforms and one where she does not conform, you may choose which 
role you want to play. However, we have been trying to keep an 
equal number of people in each condition as we run the experiment, 
and the last girl who helped us by being a confederate chose to 
not conform (or conform), so I would really like for you to conform 
(or not conform). 
Further explanationwas.given when necessary to insure that. the sub-
ject understood what her behavior in the situation should be. "Suggest-
ions" as to which role to select were readily accepted; in either role, 
the subjects' behaviors were mandated by the experimenter. 
Scenario Condition 
As the other subjects arrived they were taken to the experimental 
room by ~2 . If four subjects were present.in the experimental room, the 
last subject was taken to a separate room following a brief introduction 
to the Asch paradigm and was asked to participate in the scenario portion 
of the experiment. If fewer than three subjects were present in the ex-
perimental room, the Asch paradigm was explained to them all and all 
subjects (including the first subject who was isolated in the separate 
room) were asked to participate in the scenario portion of the experiment. 
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In any event, scenario subjects were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions (actor-independent, actor-conform, observer-independent, or 
observer-conform) and were given one of the following sets of instruct-
ions: 
Actor-Independent. Pretend that you are the subject in the Asch 
experiment ju.st described to you in the experimental room. You 
did E£!:_ conform to the erroneous judgments of the three confed-
erates; instead, you made independently correct judgments in all 
cases. (a) Complete the following as you, the subject, would 
rate yourself under tfrese· circumstances (SELF' perspective). 
(after completion of the first form) (b) Now mark how you think 
the confederates would rate you after you did not conform to their 
erroneous judgments (OTHER'S VIEW perspective). (a and b were 
counterbalanced in abba order.) 
Actor-Conform. Pretend that you are the subject in the Asch 
experiment just described to you in the experimental room. In 
each instance, you conformed to the erroneous judgments of the 
three confederates. (a) Complete the following as you, the 
subject, would rate yourself under these circumstances (SELF 
perspective). (after completion of the first form) (b) Now mark 
how you think the confederates would rate you after you had con-
formed to their erroneous judg)llents (OTHER'S VIEW perspective). 
(a and b were counterbalanced in abba order.) 
Observer-Independent. Pretend that you are one of the confederates 
in the Asch experiment just desctibed to you in the experimental 
room. The subject did E£!:_ conform to the erroneous judgments which 
the three of you made; instead, she made independently correct 
judgments in all cases. Complete the following as you, a con-
federate, would rate the subject in this experiment (OTHER per-
spective). 
Observer-Conform. Pretend that you are one of the confederates in 
the Asch experiment just described to you in the experimental room. 
In each instance, the subject confonned to the erroneous judgments 
which the three of you made. Complete the following as you, a 
confederate, would rate the subject in this experiment (OTHER 
perspective). 
In Situ Confederates 
When the required number of subjects were available for the ex-
periment, the three subjects in the experimental room were seated in a 
row and were told the following: 
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In the 1950's Solomon Asch di6 a series of studies on social 
conformity. Groups of three to nine individuals took part in 
experiments in visual discrimination. The length of a standard 
line had to be matched to one of three other lengths. One of the 
three lines was equal to the standard line and the other two lines 
differed considerably from the standard line. Individuals acted 
as accomplices by reporting unanimous, erroneous or wrong judg-
ments on twelve of the eighteen trials. Asch wanted to see if the 
subject would conform to such wrong judgments of the group. His 
results showed that in a large majority of cases the subjece did 
indeed conform to wrong judgments. We are interested in repeating 
Asch's study to see if people today sti.11 conform as they did in 
thE! 'SO's. I would like for you to take part in this experiment 
as confederates. Another girl has been signed up for the exper-
iment, but she hasn't shown up yet. When she does, another exper-
imenter will visit with her until we are ready for her in here so 
that she won't be overly suspicious and realize that you all are 
actually confederates instead of subjects like herself. I want 
you (indicating 1st subject in row) to report wrong judgments on 
all trials except #1, 2, 5, 10; 11, and 14. These are written 
inconspicuously on the board. You may choose either of the wrong 
lines, but be sure not to choose the line which matches the 
standard. Both of you (indicating 2nd and 3rd subjects in row) 
will agree with her on all 18 trials. (A brief explanatory discus-
sion followed by a rehearsal.) Now I' 11 go and see if the other 
girl is here yet. 
Experimental Manipulation for In Situ Condition 
(Asch-backwards Paradigm) 
The "subject" who had been separated in another room joined the 
others in the experimental room and was seated so that her line-judgment 
responses were always given last. The second experimenter then presented 
the following instructions for the line-judgment task: 
This is a task invoiving the discrimination of line lengths. 
On the left is a card with one line; the card at the right has 
three lines differing in length, numbered 1, 2, and 3 from left 
to right (show first card). One of the three lines at the right 
is equal to the standard line at the left. You will decide in 
each case which is the equal line. You will state your judg-
ments in terms of the numb~r of the line. There will be 18 such 
comparisons in all. As the number of comparisons is few and the 
group samll, I will call upon each of you in turn to announce 
your judgments which I shall record here on a prepared form. 
Please be as accurate as possible. 
During these trials the "subject" either conformed to the erroneous 
judgments of the ''confederates" or made independently correct 
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judgments in each case, as she had previously agreed to do. Uponcom-
pletion, the "subject" was again taken to a separate room for an alleged 
debriefing. 
In Situ Actor ("Subject") 
Isolated again in the separate room, the '1subject" was told the 
following: 
We ~ppreciate your cooperation in helping us carry out this 
experiment. The three subjects are now rating you on the basis 
of your behavior in the experiment. We would like you to complete 
a similar form (a) rating yourself (SELF perspective). (after 
completion of the first form) (b) Indicating how you expect them 
to rate you (OTHER'S VIEW perspective). (a and b were counter-
balanced in abba order.) 
In Situ Confederates 
After the "subject.!' was taken to. a separate. room. for an alleged 
debriefing, the "confederates'' were told the following: 
Another experimenter is explaining to the subject the part 
that you played as accomplices. He is also asking her to rate 
herself on this form (indicating Semantic Differential) and to 
complete an identical form as she thinks you, as confederates, 
would rate her. In addition to this, we are interested in finding 
out how you actually do feel about a subject who behaves as she 
did in a comformity experiment, how you think she would rate 
herself, and how you feel she would predict your ratings of her. 
I want you (indicating one of the subjects, as randomly determined 
prior to the experiment) to complete this form expressing your 
true impressions of the subject (in situ observer - OTHER per-
spective). I want you (indicating-a different subject as randomly 
determined prior to the experiment) to complete this form as you 
think she is actually rating herself (in situ role player - SELF 
persp.ective). And I want you (indicating remaining subject) to 
complete this form expressing how you feel the subject expects 
to be rated by you (in situ role player - OTHER'S VIEW perspective). 
Please be as accurate and honest as possible. 
Upon completion of the forms, all subjects were thanked for their 
participation in the experiment, asked not to discuss the experiment 
with:anyone, and were told that feedback concerning the experiment 
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(debriefing) would be provided upon completion of the experiment by 
their class instructors (this was accomplished by handout material which 
included paragraphs describing the outcomes of several other experiments). 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
One-way ANOVA's (producing an F-value which corresponds to !2) were 
performed on eight sets of two-group data, with 1 and 18 degrees of free-
dom in each set (n = 10 per cell). The lowest acceptable levels of sig-
nificance was the .05 level in each case. 
Hypothesi.s I: Observers in In Situ Interaction 
When rating actors on the OTHER perspective, the in situ observers 
differentiated on all but one of the seven measures (Activity) on the 
basis of the observed conforming or independent behavior of the actor in 
the Asch-backwards paradigm (Table I). As can be seen in Table III, 
these observers rated conforming actors significantly higher on Ac-
commodation, Cooperation, and Inhibition and significantly lower on 
Affect, Evaluation, and Potency than they rated independent conforming 
actors. It is clear that the conformity manipulation was successful and 
and that conforming subjects received negative ratings on the basis of 
this manipulation, generally replicating the findings of Kane and 
Tedeschi (1972). 
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Hypothesis II: Role-Pl~ying as Observers 
in the Scenario Condition 
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As can be seen in Table II, when scenario observers rated actors on 
the OTIIER perspective, they, too, differentiated on all but one of the 
seven measures (Activity) on the basis of the described conforming or 
independent behavior of the actor in the Asch-backwards paradigm. In-
spection of the means (Table lII) indicates that the judgments of scenario 
observers were in complete agreement with those judgments of in situ 
observers, rating conforming actor significantly higher on Accomodation, 
Cooperation, and Inhibition and significantly lower on Affect, Evaluat-
ion, and Potency than they rated independent actors. The findings of 
Vance and Helm (1975) were thus replicated--role-playing observers can 
accurately predict the ratings of in situ observers when rating an 
actor from the OTHER perspective, even though they did not experience 
the experimental situation. 
Hypothesis III: In Situ Actors, In Situ Role.,. 
Playing Actors, and Scenario 
Role-Playing Actors 
When:·.in situ actors were asked to rate themselves following the 
enactment of the Asch-backwards situation, they did not differentiate on 
any of the seven dependent measures (Table IV) as a result of their be-
havior in the experiment. This lack of effect possibly results from the 
limited choise of behavior granted them. They did, after all, simply 
agree t.o behave in the manner suggested to them by the experimenter. 
There is no reason to expect them to accept responsibility for their be-














SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF 
OTHER PERSPECTIVE BY 
IN SITU OBSERVERS ---
Source SS df 
Between Subjects 4.05 1 
Within Subjects 84,90 18 
Between Subjects 12.80 1 
Within Subjects 33,00 18 
Between Subjects 156.80 1 
Within Subjects 234,40 18 
Between Subjects 51.20 1 
Within Subjects 46.oo 18 
Between Subjects 101.25 1 
Within Subjects 176,50 18 
Between Subjects 26.45 1 
Within Subjects 36,10 18 
Between Subjects 378.45 1 
Within Subjects 153 .30 18 
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MS F ratio 
4.05 .86 
4.72 






















*** .• 001 
**** .0001 
TABLE II 
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OTHER 
PERSPECTIVY BY ROLE-PLAYING 
OBSERVERS IN SCENARIO 
CONDITION 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 31.25 1 31.25 
Within Subjects 181.JO 18 10.07 
Between Subjects 18.05 1 18,05 
Within Subjects 51.70 18 2.87 
·Between Subjects 125.00 1 125.00 
Within Subjects 242.80 18 13.49 
Between Subjects 125.00 1 125.00 
Within Subjects 9.20 18 0.51 
Between Subjects 110.45 1 110.45 
Within Subjects 277,30 18 15.41 
Between Subjects 48,05 1 Li-Eh05 
Within Subjects 43.70 18 2.43 
Between Subjects 361.25 1 361.25 



















MEANS OF OTHER PERSPECTIVY BY 










































SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SELF 
PERSPECTIVE BY IN SITU ACTORS ---
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 4.05 1 4.05 
Within Subjects 215,70 18 ll,98 
Between Subjects 1.80 1 1.80 
Within Subjects 41.20 18 2.29 
Between Subjects 80,00 1 80.00 
Within Subjects 503.20 18 27.96 
Between Subjects 1.25 1 1.25 
Within Subjects 41.70 18 2.32 
BetwE~en Subjects 11.25 1 11.25 
Within Subjects 285,70 18 15.87 
Between Subjects .so 1 .80 
Within Subjects 91.00 18 5,06 
Between Subjects 20.00 1 20.00 











the experimental Asch-backwards situation by acting as "confederates" 
also did n:ot differentiate on any of the dependent measures. :when predict-
ing the SELF ratings of the in situ actor (''subject") (Table V). It is 
important to note, however, that role-playing actors in the scenario 
condition responded to the description of the conforming or independent 
behavior of the in situ actors by differentiating on five of the seven 
dependent measures (Table VI). As indicated in Table VII; when these 
role players were asked to assume the role of actor, those in the conform 
condition rated themselves significantly higher on Accommodation, Cooper-
ation, and Inhibition and significantly lower on Affect and Potency than 
did the role players in the inedpendent condition. It appears that while 
in situ role-playing actors who have participated in the experimental 
situation can successfully match the pattern of impression ratings 
provided by in,.~- actors on the SELF. perspective, role.,. playing actors 
in the scenario condition who have not experienced the situation cannot. 
It is likely that in situ actors view the event and their role in idio-
syncratic terms related to the environmental stimuli, making it difficult 
for role players who have not experienced the situation to match their 
impression ratings. 
When asked to rate themselves as they expected to be rated by the 
observers ("confederates"), in situ actors departed markedly from their 
SELF ratings, differentiating on six of the seven dependent measures in 
this instance (Table VIII). The means in Table XI indicate that conform-
ing actors expected to be rated significantly higher on Accommodation, 
Cooperation, and Inhibition and significantly lower on Affect, Evaluation, 
and Potency by the observers (''confederates") than did independent actors. 










SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SELF 
PERSPECTIVE BY IN SITU 
ROLE-PIAYING ACTORS 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 7,20 1 7.20 
Within Subjects 205.80 18 11.43 
Between Subjects 2.45 1 2.45 
Within Subjects 26.10 18 1.45 
Between Subjects 7,20 1 7,20 
Within Subjects 340.80 18 18,93 
Between Subjects 9,80 1 9.80 
Within Subjects 85.40 18 4.74 
Between Subjects 48.05 1 48.05 
Within Subjects 298,90 18 16.61 
Between Subjects 1.80 1 1,80 
Within Subjects 46.oo 18 2.56 
Between Subjects 18,05 1 18,05 












SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARtANCE OF SELF 
PERSPECTIVE BY ROLE-PLAYING 
ACTORS IN SCENARIO 
CONDITION 
Analysis Source SS df MS F ratio 
Activity Between Subjects 33,80 1 J3.80 3,08 
Within Subjects 197.40 18 l0,97 
Accommodation Between Subjects 48.05 1 48.05 30.35**** 
Within Subjects 28.50 18 1.58 
Affect Between Subjects 72.20 1 72.20 5.02* 
Within Subjects 259.00 18 14.39 
Cooperation Between Subjects 51,20 1 51.20 14.27** 
Within Subjects 64.60 18 3,59 
Evaluation Between Subjects 45.00 1 45.00 J.42 
Within Subjects 236,80 18 13.16 
Inhibition Between Subjects 54.l.J,5 1 5'+.45 17.98*** 
Within Subjects 54,50 18 3,03 
Potency Between Subjects 145.80 1 145.80 6.37* 















MEANS OF SELF PERSPECTIVE BY IN SITU 
ACTOR, IN SITU ROLE-PIAYING ACTORS, 
AND SCENARIO ROLE-PIAYING ACTORS 
Scenario 
In Situ Actors Role-Playing. --· Actors 
Conform: 13.80 15.50 
Independent: 14. 70 18.10 
Conform: 5.80 5.90 
Independent: 5.20 2.80 
Conform: 20.20 19.30 
Independent: 24.20 23.10 
Conform: 6.30 5.70 
Independent: 5.80 2.50 
Conform: 21.30 20.40 
Independent: 22.80 23.40 
Conform: 3.30 5.70 
Independent: 2.90 2.40 
Conform: 13.60 13.30 
































SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OTHER'S 
VIEW PERSPECTIVY BY IN SITU 
ACTORS 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 61.25 1 6L25 
Within Subjects 273,30 18 15.18 
Between Subjects 26.45 1 .26.45 
Within Subjects 50.50 18 2.81 
Between Subjects 273,80 1 273.80 
Within Subjects 318.00 18 17.67 
Between Subjects 22.05 1 22.05 
Within Subjects 84.50 18 4.69 
Between Subjects 151.25 1 151.25 
Within Subjects 356,50 18 19.81 
Between Subjects 33,80 1 33,80 
Within Subjects 74.20 18 4.12 
Between Subjects 186.05 1 186,05 























.SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OTHER 1 S 
VIEW PERSPECTIVE BY IN SITU ROLE-
PLAYING ACTORS 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 54.45 1 54,45 
Within Subjects 430.50 18 23.92 
Between Subjects 7.20 1 7.20 
Within Subjects 37,80 18 2.10 
Between Subjects 61.25 1 61.25 
Within Subjects 381,70 18 21.21 
Between Subjects 57.80 J'. 57,80 
Within Subjects 35,00 18 1.94 
Between Subjects 120,05 1 120,05 
Within Subjects 310.90 18 17.27 
Between Subjects 12.80 1 12.80 
Within Subjects 33,00 18 1.83 
Between Subjects 224.45 1 224.45 























SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OTHER'S 
VIEW PERSPECTIVY BY ROLE-PLAYING 
ACTORS IN SCENARIO CONDITION 
Source SS df MS 
Between Subjects 36.45 1 36.45 
Within Subjects 345.30 18 19.18 
Between Subjects 72.20 1 72.20 
Within Subjects 15.60 18 .87 
Between Subjects .45 1 .45 
Within Subjects 324.10 18 18.0l 
Between Subjects 115.20 1 115.20 
Within Subjects 12.00 18 .67 
Between Subjects 12.80 1 12.80 
Within Subjects 330.40 18 18.36 
Between Subjects 20.00 1 20.00 
Within Subjects 80.80 18 4.49 
Between Subjects 732.05 1 732.05 



















MEANS OF OTHER'S VIEW PERSPECTIVE BY 
IN SITU ACTORS, I~ SITU ROLE-
PLA YING ACTORS, AND SCENARIO 
ROLE-PLAYING ACTORS 
Scenario 
In Situ Actors Ro-le-Playing 
Actors 
Conform: 10.90 13.40 
Independent: 14.40 16. J.O= 
Conform: 6.20 6.00 
Independent: 3.90 2.20 
Conform: 13.20 17.70 
Independent: 20.60 18.00 
Conform: 6.40 6.60 
Independent: 4.30 1.80 
Conform: 14.50 17.40 
Independent: 20.00 19.00 
Conform: 5.30 5.60 
Independent: 2. 70 3.60 
Conform: 9.90 9.10 




















matches those actually given by the observers when rating the actors 
(see Table I and II). But more to the point, role-playing actors in 
the in situ condition significantly differentiated on four of the de-
pendent measures when predicting the in situ actor's OTHER'S VIEW ratings 
(Table IX), predicting that conforming actors would expect to be rated 
higher on Cooperation and Inhibition and lower on Evaluation and Potency 
than would independent actors (Table XI). Although the Accommodation and 
Affect measures failed to reach the .05 significance level, these measures 
did approach significance (Accommodation: F = 3.43, p (.08; Affect: 
F = 2.89, p ~.10), again indicating that role players who have exper-
ienced the experimental situation experienced by in situ actors can 
predict their impression ratings with at least a fair degree of accuracy. 
Role-playing actors in the scenario condition did not accurately match 
the OTHER'S VIEW pattern of ratings provid.e.d by the in situ actors (Table 
X), however, failing to differentiate on the Affect and Evaluation dim-
ensions which were significant for the in situ actors in this perspective. 
They did agree with the in situ actors on the other measures, predicting 
that conforming actors would expect to be rated significantly higher on 
Accommodation, Cooperation, and Inhibition, and significantly lower on 
Potency than would the independent actors (Table XI). Again, it appears 
that role-playing actors who have not experienced the experimental sit-
uation are less able to accurately match the ratings of in situ actors, 
supporting ·the third and major hypothesis of this study. It is interest-
ing to note, however, that the ratings which the scenario role players 
could not accurately predict deal essentially with how well one feels 
that she is liked by another (Affect and Evaluation - OTHER'S VIEW) and 
how she views herself. All role players were able to accurately predict 
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how the actor would expect others to rate her on behavioral and strength 
dimensions. 
Results of a Supplementary Investigation 
It occurred to the writer that the divergent results obtained from 
in situ actors and scenario role-playing actors might be nothing more than 
a reflection of the different information provided them. Due to the 
experimental manipulation, it was necessary to fully inform the in situ 
actors of the Asch-backwards paradigm and their part in its enactment. 
This information was not given to the role-playing actors in the scenario 
condition. The in situ actors completed their rating forms for the two 
perspectives (SELF and OTHER'S VIEW) wholly aware that their behavior in 
the experimental room had been merely a compliance to the wishes of the 
experimenter, with minimal choice on their pa:r.t. The scenario role-
playing actors assumed the role of actor without this awareness. The 
obtained results might have been accounted for if similar information had 
been given both sets of subjects. It was determined that some type of 
experimental check was necessary to clarify these results. Twenty 
female undergraduates were asked to participate as role players in the 
experiment, 10 in the conform condition and 10 in the independent con-
dition. These subjects were given information identical to that given to 
the in situ actors, including the experimenter's "suggestions" for their 
behavior in the experimental room. They were also told that in every 
case the in situ actors had agreed to comply with these suggestions by 
either consistently conforming or making independently correct line 
judgments following the unanimous, erroneous judgments of the confederates. 
These subjects were given the same instructions as had previously been 
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given to the scenario role-playing actors in the original experiment 
(see "Procedures" in Chapter III) and were asked to complete an identical 
version of the Semantic Differential (Appendix) from both the SELF and 
OTHER'S VIEW perspectives. Again, these perspectives were presented to 
the subjects in abba order. Analysis of the data (one-way ANOVA's pro-
ducing an £-value which corresponds to !2, with 1 and 18 degrees of free-
dom and !! = 10 per cell) revealed that these role players differed from 
the original .role-playing actors in the scenario condition only one 
measure, the Affect dimension on the SELF perspective. The current role 
players failed to differentiate on this measure whereas the original 
role players had made this differentiation on the SELF perspective. 
Both sets of role players agreed completely on ratings for the OTHER'S 
VIEW perspective. It appears that when role players are aware that their 
supposed behavior is somewhat externally controlled they are not likely 
to change_ their self Affect rating as a consequence of that behavior. 
More importantly, the similarity of results obtained by these two sets 
of scenario role-playing actors lends credence to the main hypothesis set 
forth in this paper -- role-playing actors who have not actually ex-
perienced the experimental situation cannot accurately match the ratings 
of in situ actors in either the SELF or OTHER'S VIEW perspectives, even 




The present data supported the three hypotheses which were developed 
in this ·paper. When rat·ing actors on the basis of their conforming or 
independent behavior in an Asch-backwards situation, the "confederates" 
tend to rate the conforming actors more negatively than they rated the 
independent actors, confirming the original findings of Kane and Tedeschi 
(1972). Role players who did not experience the situation accurately 
matched this rating pattern when the conforming and independent behaviors 
were described to them, replicating an earlier study by Vance and Helm 
(1975). Finally, role-playing subjects who assumed the role of the con-
forming or independent actors after participating in the experimental 
situation predicted the SELF and OTHER'S VIEW ratings of in situ actors 
fairly accurately, while role players who predict these ratings without 
benefit of experiencing these situational cues did not accurately match 
the actual SELF and OTHER'S FIEW impression ratings. This is probably due 
to the circumstantial nature of the factors being considered by in situ 
actors, a state of information which is difficult to induce in role-
playing subjects by a mere description of the situation. 
The present experimental results appear to make a useful contribution 
to the existing literature. As was noted in the literature review, role-
playing research has typically investigated the prediction of actual 
behaviors rather than the impression ratings which were considered in 
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the present study. The present results, however, demonstrate that the 
actor/observer divergence appears in impression ratings, and is associated 
with role-playing accuracy. The informational factors considered by an 
observer are readily accessible to role players even when they have not 
actually experienced the situation, while those considered by actors ap-
parently become salient only in the context of actual experiences and, 
consequently, are not comprehended by role-playing subjects who only read 
a description of the situation. These considerations seem to substant-
iate the argument that one's viewpoint becomes important in the role-
playing of actual behaviors. Individuals must adopt either an actor or 
observer viewpoint when contemplating an act or a situation, and will 
consider primarily, if not exclusively, the set of factors which are 
appropriate to their viewpoint. 
It would seem that the factors being considered by role-playing 
subjects and their degree of active involvement in the role are crucial 
determinants in their ability to duplicate results obtained in studies 
which employ deception. When asked to assume the role of an observer, 
such as when an individual's behavior is described to them and they are 
asked to rate him on the basis of that behavior, role-playing subjects 
can consider the same dispositional or "trait" factors that are thought 
to be considered by those who actually observe the behavior first-hand. 
When role-playing subjects similarly are asked to assume the role of the 
actor hims.elf, however, the situation is changed markedly. The environ-
mental cues, with which the actual actor is concerned and to which he 
is responding, are not available to the role player. The role player 
has only limited information concerning the behavior he supposedly 
emitted, without benefit of situational cues which are available only in 
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an experiential context. He is forced to focus on factors which differ 
considerably from those being considered by actors who are actually 
experiencing the situation in situ. 
The limits of role playing should now be more clearly defined: 
role players who assume a role on the basis of written information are 
more accurate when their judgment involves consideration of general 
dispositional type factors rather than environmental factors, which 
probably become salient for the subject only as they are actually ex-
perienced by him. When role players must consider factors typically 
considered by actors, they must necessarily be exposed to the environ-
mental cues relevant to the situation. Role-playing subjects who do not 
experience the research setting in situ are therefore most accurate as 
observers, making judgments only about the more general dispositional 
traits of the actor. 
The evidence indicates that first-hand knowledge of the circum-
stances is sufficient to accentuate the situational concomitants of 
action for role players. Even identical information may not be neces-
sary since the in situ role-playing actors were able to match the ratings 
provided by the real actors without knowing that the actors were be-
having under experimental constraint. Their familiarity with the 
experimental situation apparently caused them to minimize attributions 
of personal differences which others, who had not had this experience 
(scenario 'role players) associated with the reported behaviors. They 
were at the same time, however, aware that the servers would make at-
tributions of personal differences. The in situ role-playing actor, 
with exactly the same information as the in situ observers, knew that 
the real actor would deny attributions of personal differences and sim-
ultaneously knew that the real observers would make these personal 
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attributions. Only the scenario role-playing actorlacked sufficient 
information to recognize that the actor would deny personal reasons 
for her action, even when they were told that the actors were acting 
under experimental constraint. Scenario role-playing actors apparently 
made self attributions as if they were observers. That is, they were 
quite willing to guess that if they had behaved as the written scenario 
suggested, it must be due to some personal quality inasmuch as they 
reported personal attributions.which were distinguished as a function· 
of behaviors. 
The results of the OTHER'S VIEW predictions seem to show that 
impression management attempts to ascertain the0 nature of the impres-
sion another gains are fairly accurate under both "real" and ''abstract" 
conditions, except when the attribute under consideration deals with 
liking in which case scenario role players fail to differentiate on 
the basis of their supposed behavior. 
A disadvantage in the design of the present study was mentioned in 
Chapter III of this paper. The design did not allow a test of the ability 
of role players, whether actors or observers, to depict the subtle in-
teraction effects which are often of primary interest to experimenters 
in the behavioral sciences. Subsequent research in this area should be 
directed toward a test of the effectiveness and accuracy of role-playing 
actors and observers in relation to the statistical interactions of 
the independent variables. The present data suggests that if subtle 
statistical interaction effects are to be "picked up" by role players 
it may be under conditions of high actor-observer empathy, and when role 
players can actually experience the experimental situation. It is under 
these circumstances that role players are able to consider the widest 
range of information in formulating their predictions. 
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It is of interest to note the high degree of accuracy with which 
actors anticipated how they would be rated by observers in the in situ 
phase of the study. The results indicate that actors can accurately 
predict how observers will rate them even though this represented a 
drastic departure from how they actually rated themselves. This would· 
suggest that interaction analyses would be aided by taking into account 
not an actor's awareness of his own perceptual attributions but also his 
awareness of the perceptual attributions of those who observe his actions. 
In conclusion, the present study has shown that role players who do 
not directly experience the experimental manipulation but instead rely 
on a written description of the situation can accurately match the 
attribution rating pattern of subjects in an actual deception study only 
when it is the general, dispositional factors of an actor which are 
considered. When investigators use scenario role playing"methods, they 
are tapping only observer considerations, and therefore should not 
consider these methods for studies of an actor's attributions, impressi-
ons, or behaviors. If the situational factors typically experienced by 
actors are of importance, they should also be experienced by the role-
playing subjects. Finally, future research which aims to explore the 
capabilities of role playing procedures should focus on the production 
of statistical interaction effects. 
... 
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